































Paper prepared for presentation at the  99
th EAAE Seminar ‘Trust and Risk in 







Copyright 2006 by Carbone and Sorrentino.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make 
verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided 
that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. Anna Carbone and  Alessandro Sorrentino   469
The European Policy for Food Quality and the Fischler’s Reform
Anna Carbone1 and  Alessandro Sorrentino2
1DEAR- Università della Tuscia,Via S. Camillo de Lellis, s.n.c.- 01100 Viterbo, Italy,
2 DISTATEQ - Università della Tuscia,Via del Paradiso, 47- 01100 Viterbo, Italy,
 acarbone@unitus.it, sorrenti@unitus.it
Abstract
Fischler’s Reform of the Cap has introduced economic support to reinforce the range of
instruments aimed at promoting food quality. Before the Reform, European Union market
intervention for food quality was confined to the regulatory ground. The paper discusses the
economic justifications for financial aid in the case of quality improvement and in the case of
information circulation and provision of assurance to consumers. The possibility to add new
Quality Schemes at the existing ones is criticized because of the information overcrowding.
Furthermore, it is argued that a “race to the bottom” mechanism could be enforced as a result
of the introduction of the possibility to settle Quality Schemes on a national basis. The paper
also shows that the unsatisfactory functioning of existing Quality Schemes could be better
faced by simplification of the whole quality certification system; by a communication effort
at a general level and not only for single Quality Schemes; and by a better coordination of the
different strategies of the different stakeholders in the food chains.
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1.   Introduction
Market intervention of Common Agricultural Policy (Cap) have been increasingly criticized,
among the other reasons, for its negative effects on food safety, on the environmental
equilibrium and on the overall quality of productions (Lobstein, 1999). Together with the
increase in consumers’ interest in these topics, this is why with the Cap reform process,
started at the beginning of the nineties, financial aid to agriculture has been more and more
justified with the corrections of the past distortions. Food quality and safety, environmental
protection, economic diversification and preservation of traditional products and landscapes,
have become the new justifications of support that seem to gather, up to now, an increasing
consensus.
In this context, with respect to food quality, the new reform approved in 2003, known as
Fischler’s Reform, introduced, for the first time, economic incentives to farmers and to
farmers’ associations. Incentives are given both to improve production quality and to increase
communication between producers and consumers, in order to enhance consumers’
knowledge of food quality and their trust in the European agro-food sector. The European
Union (EU) regulatory framework for the so called Quality Schemes (QSs) has not been
changed by the Reform, and it is essentially based on Reg. 2081/92 for Pdo and Pgi, Reg.470   The European Policy for Food Quality and the Fischler’s Reform
1493/99 for VQPRD, Reg. 2082/92 for Tsg, and Reg. 2092/91 for Organic farming products.
Nevertheless, new QSs are entitled to receive financial aid even when they are defined at the
national level. 
The paper discusses the implications of the new course of the European policy for food
quality, both from the point of view of the economic justifications and of the expected
impacts of the new measures. Furthermore, the efficacy of payments aimed at enhancing the
use of Quality Schemes is questioned on the basis of the discussion of the causes of their
actual unsatisfactory performance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two summarizes the content of the new measures
introduced by the Reform, both in the Regulation for Rural Development and in the so called
“Horizontal Regulation”. Section three briefly discusses the scope for public market
intervention for food quality; in particular a distinction is made between those cases in which
the regulation addresses a market failure, and those in which payments are aimed at
overcoming structural barriers, or to promote innovative behaviour. Section four is devoted to
the analysis of the causes of the limited success of existing QSs, with special reference to the
Pdos; on this basis, it will be discussed the likely effect of the introduction of  the incentives
to the adoption of QSs. In section five the attention focuses on some remedies that could have
been adopted to make the actual EU quality certification system be more effective, but have
not been adopted.
2.   The measures for quality in the Fischler’s Reform
Both the so called “First Pillar” and “Second Pillar” of the new Cap provide for enhancing to
products quality, and introduce, for the first time, the possibility to support, with financial aid,
producers committed to quality improvement. In this section there is a very short presentation
of the Reform contents with respect to quality.
The first justification given in Reg. 1783/03 (the regulation on Rural Development) for
introducing new measures for the enhancement of quality is that: “the range of instruments to
promote food quality needs to be reinforced.” In the sense that “farmers should be encouraged
to participate in Community or National food quality schemes”. Besides, “there is a need to
improve consumers' awareness of the existence and specifications of products produced
under Community or national food quality schemes”.
Article 24 introduces temporary financial support to farmers who improve production quality
and/or for the promotion of high quality products (up to 3,000 Euros per year for no more
than five years in the proportion of 70% of eligible costs as a maximum). Payments should be
targeted to the following objectives: i) to help producers who provide assurances to
consumers on the quality of the product, or on the production process, through the
participation in food quality schemes; ii) to increase the value added of primary products and
to enhance market opportunities; iii) to improve consumer information on the availability and
specifications of such products. Support is granted to producers who participate to EU or
National-level quality schemes which comply with a number of conditions, including the
following: quality has to be obtained by specific production rules; compliance with those
specifications has to be verified by an independent body; the scheme has to be open to all
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Also the so called “horizontal” Regulation -Reg. 1782/03- includes a measure for quality. In
particular, article 69 introduces the possibility for Member States to finance, on a voluntary
basis, specific programs aimed at: i) improving the quality of production; ii) preserving the
environment; iii)improving market opportunities for the products. Member States can use for
this purpose up to 10% of the “national ceilings”, and these should be spent within the same
sector. Hence, the direct payment generated in this way is at least partially coupled to
production. This measure has been, up to now, implemented by only few Member States and
the quality standard fixed as a requirement to receive the payment has largely been objected
as to loose or not relevant.
Furthermore, other measures introduced with the 2003 Reform are indirectly aimed at
promoting product quality, despite quality is not their major objective. This is the case of the
so called conditionality, of the support to farm audit, and the support to farmers who adopt
production process that are respectful of animal welfare.
3.   Economic justification for public intervention in food quality markets
Public regulation for product quality is commonly justified by market failures due to the
important role played by information. The lack of information and its asymmetric distribution
among agents leads to different cases of market failure: firstly, the moral hazard behaviour of
firms selling low-quality goods but pretending they are high-quality (Akerlof, 1970);
secondly, negative externalities are generated by the impossibility to distinguish goods of
different producers, even in absence of opportunistic behaviour (Hennessy et al., 2003).
Furthermore, the semi-public nature of quality information may induce sub-optimal
production (Arrow, 1962). In such situations, public regulation is aimed at increasing,
directly or indirectly, the amount of reliable information circulating within the market. 
One additional justification of public intervention is based on the existence of entry barriers
arising from the fixed costs which firms needs to bear in order to establish their reputation in
the market .Such costs may generate scale economies that penalise small firms and reduce
competition. Regulation is thus meant to provide the institutional framework for establishing
collective reputation of small-scale producers, gathering together within a common name.
The Regulation also prevents free riding behaviour that may arise in such cases (Tirole, 1996;
Carbone, 1997).
Asymmetric distribution of information, its semi public good nature and the small average
size of firms in the agro-food sector usually justify public regulation. In the case of food,
quality takes often the form of credence attributes and it is mainly guaranteed by
certifications within the framework of National or EU laws. These norms are, thus, explicitly
aimed at providing reliable information to consumers, but they are also meant to help small
scale traditional firms of the agro-food sector to gain visibility in the markets (see, for
example, the introduction of EU Reg.2081/92).
The idea underling this approach is that consumers would be willing to pay the higher price
corresponding to the higher costs of producing a better quality, if they are provided with
reliable information on the true quality of goods. 
In this vein, financial incentives to produce and communicate information –as settled with EU
Reg.1783/03- could be only partially justified by the above mentioned reputation costs, as the
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associated to the QS. Economic support could be required because of the necessity to settle
the reputation of the whole European certification system. The complexity of such
information requires for a coordinated effort at the central level. 
Financial support aimed at increasing food quality itself – as envisaged in art. 24 of EU
Reg.1783/03 and in art. 69 of EU Reg.1782/03- cannot be justified in the same framework.
The determination of product quality is one of the strategic choice in firms’ life, and there are
no reasons that justify public intervention for fixing quality standards apart from quality
aspects related to food safety The higher costs of producing higher quality should be
undertaken only in the case in which consumers are willing to pay for it. Payments to farmers
aimed at promoting the production of specific qualities could be only justified, on a
temporary basis, by structural barriers preventing farmers to adjust production. 
4.   Problems with EU Quality Schemes
As already recalled, the main objective of the quality measures introduced with the Reform is
to enhance the effectiveness of the pre-existing legislative framework. Therefore, it is worth
discussing evidence of the way the Quality Schemes have been functioning to date. The focus
here is to Pdo and Pgi in Italy, a country where there is, indeed, a true and rooted interest in
typical, traditional products both from the demand and the supply side. In Italy there are 151
Pdo-Pgi product (the figure refers to October, 5th, 2005), while in 1996, when Reg. 2081/92
was enforced, they were 66. Their number, hence, more than doubled in ten years and, in
2002, their value (at firm prices) accounts for 11.3% of the total value of the corresponding
industry (cheese, preserved meet, olive oil, cereals and fruits and vegetables). These is the
main evidence of the supposed success of the Pdo Quality Schemes. 
Nevertheless, a deeper insight shows that only ten products out of 151 Pdos and Pgis
represent about 90% of their total market value, and that two third of this value come from
only the first four products: Parmigiano Reggiano, Grana Padano, Parma ham and S.Daniele
ham; products whose reputation and market success goes far beyond the existence of the
certification of origin. Furthermore, the great majority of the other Pdo-Pgi products are
almost absent from the markets and their economic value is insignificant even if compared
with the production potential of the area protected by the Pdo-Pgi certification. This means
that the vast majority of actual production obtained within the area entitled to use the
certification, is sold in the market without any certification. 
The relevant question is then: what are the reasons why new Pdo-Pgi are settled if they are not
used? and which are the causes of the difficulties that apparently arise? Furthermore it should
be understood the extent to which the financial aid to farmers joining Quality Schemes,
introduced with the Reform, could be effective in removing existing constraints. 
A first type of difficulty in using Pdo and Pgi -or similar kinds of certifications or “Shared
brand names”- pertains to the dimension of the production units as well as to the dimension of
the target market. The small production scale may prevents vertical integration, and prevent
farmers to sell in the final food product market. Under such conditions, farmers may have no
incentive to certify their products.  Furthermore, in local markets producers-consumers
communication is direct, and trust does not need formal guarantees. Consumers would not
accept to be charged the costs of certification, because they already know the product, and
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A second type of difficulty is due to the complexity of the functioning mechanism of
collective reputation. Gathering under a common name (i.e. the Pdo-Pgi name) implies the
establishment of a complex set of relations among producers. Firstly, the common reputation
implies that the performance of each firm depends on what the others do. This is the reason
why a common set of rules should be set in order to limit quality heterogeneity and
variability, and in order to prevent opportunistic behaviour. Secondly, these common rules,
once put in place, represent an additional set of relations among producers. Thirdly, if
producers are organised in chains they are also vertically co-ordinated. This means that they
sell and buy to each other raw materials and intermediate goods. Firms may, then, be exposed
to opportunistic behaviours, and they may also act in the role of price takers if confronted
with processing firm and retailers of bigger size. Furthermore, agreements on production
rules are less likely to be reached, the more the firms are structurally diversified, have
different market strategies and show different degrees of local roots. 
A third type of difficulties concern the demand side. Consumers are  increasingly involved in
food quality, in traditional products, in typical food. Nonetheless, empirical evidence shows
that about 35% of consumers in the European Union relate the quality of a product to its
geographical origin; moreover, 80% do not know the meaning of the acronym PGI, and 72%
do not know PDO (Nomisma, 2001). Most authors explain this situation with the complexity
of the concept of quality and the high number of relevant quality attributes. This, in turn, has
brought to the creation a wide range of Quality Schemes, both as a result of public regulation,
and as a result of firms autonomous marketing strategies. This high number of “quality signs”
in the market has brought about a loss of visibility of individual schemes (Hassan and
Monier-Dilhan, 2002; Verbeke, 2005; Carbone and Sorrentino, 2003). 
To make it more difficult for consumers to understand the huge amount of information
generated by all these quality schemes, some of them do admit significant exceptions to the
general rules settled with Regulations. For example, this is the case of Pdo and Pgi: Parma
ham is a Pdo, but it is produced with pork meat produced in many Italian regions, an area far
more large than what we call Parma region, so that, following what Reg. 2081/92 says, it
should be a Pgi. About 95% of Pecorino Romano cheese is produced in Sardinia, an island far
away from Rome, which the name of the Pdo is supposed to suggest. 
If Pdo-Pgi hardly have proven effective in helping producers to increase their market shares,
at least in Italy, it is to be understood the reason why they are continuously increasing in
number. In Italy this is mainly due to the role played by the Public Administrations (PAs). At
the local level, PAs are often more involved than producers in the process that leads to a new
Pdo-Pgi: the Pas are convinced of the usefulness of the common labels, which are considered
a rather simple, visible and low-cost kind of intervention. It is therefore regarded as a
relatively easy way for maximizing political consensus among producers. And yet it must be
explained why producers are not involved, or not sufficiently involved, when setting product
characteristics, production areas, and other rules. The reason is that, both policy makers and
producers, commonly believe that establishing a common label is the only element of a
common competitive strategy. The misconception is that a common label is in itself sufficient
to create demand for the product; for increasing consumer willingness to pay and in reducing
competition and preventing moral hazard. 
The search for political consensus has deep consequences on the features of common labels.
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areas, and lowering quality standard, simply because higher quality requirements would
exclude producers who are not able to meet them. It is clear, then, that there is a trade-off
between policy makers’ objective to maximize consensus and the conditions for a proper
market functioning for common labels. 
It should now be clear how the poor utilization of Quality Schemes is due to a complex set of
reasons that go far beyond the single farm structural and behavioral characteristics. It is then
inappropriate to simply frame the problem as a matter of financial support. Furthermore, the
eligibility to financial aid could be an incentive for farmers to join Quality Schemes even if
they do not intend to certificate the product they sell. Should this be the case, the results
would not only be a waste of money, but also an increase of Quality Schemes in a market that
is already overloaded of information, and in which it is difficult to distinguish reliable from
unreliable information, and useful from useless information. 
This problem of information overload especially arises in the case of new Quality Schemes
entitled to support under article 24 of Reg. 1783/03. Particularly, new Quality Schemes set up
at the national level may weaken all the EU quality certification system for more than one
reasons. Firstly, because of the potential proliferations of QS in the 25 European Union
member countries. Secondly, because the national QS will compete in the market, and this
would lead to a “regulatory chill” situation, or even to a “race to the bottom” of the quality
standards adopted by the apparently similar QS of the different countries. Actually, a
situation like this seems to contradict the significant effort carried over the last decades to
unify the regulatory framework for food quality and information with the twofold scope to
help producers in the competition game and to protect consumers from the consequences of
information asymmetry. 
5.   Conclusions 
This last section contains hints on positive actions that could effectively improve the
functioning of the existing European regulatory framework for food quality:
1. Firstly, a line of action should concern a stronger information strategy. As shown, despite a
wide and increasing interest in quality on a general ground, consumers suffer from an evi-
dent lack of information on the relevant quality attributes and on the different factors affec-
ting food quality. Consumers also lack information on the different characteristics of QS, in
terms of the quality attributes to which they refer and in terms of the kind of guarantee and
the associated level of trust. There is the need for a sort of European Authority aimed at pro-
moting information and trust in the European quality certification system. Such an Autho-
rity should supervise the coherence of the whole system, its relaibility and correct
functioning and should actively promote the circulation of information on food quality.
2.  Secondly, the actual framework for QS needs a re-organization. Particularly, as seen, con-
sumers may get confused by the very slight differences existing between Pdo and Pgi, as
stated by Reg.2081/92, and bythe numerous existing exceptions to the general rules. Some
products are accepted as Pdos, while they should in fact be Pgi according to a strict interpre-
tation of the regulation. The likely result of such a situation is that consumers get confused,
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3.  Thirdly, there is a need to incentive the different stakeholders along the food chain to coor-
dinate their communication strategies. Generally speaking, the presence in the market of
brands of producers and distributors represents a serious threat to the effectiveness of public
certification, at least potentially. Firstly, distinctive signals of a private nature benefit from
considerable economies of scale, both in defining the content of the message and in its dif-
fusion. Viceversa, the majority of companies that utilise certifications are small scale firms,
and therefore they have few resources for investments in communication. One more advan-
tage for private brands is that they convey very simple messages. On the other hand, the
quality claims associated with brands tend to be more vague when compared to the certifi-
cation ones. These two features are the consequence of the lack of legal obligation, as well
as of the need for simplicity arising from the attempt to make the message more under-
standable and memorable. Nevertheless, major retailing chains have shown, in recent years,
a growing interest in placing genuine PDO products in their display window distinct from
their standard industrial fare, which anyway, stills remains the hard core of their product
range. This strategy, that is a response to the need for an image more in line with consumer
trends, leaves room for some cooperation with local producers of certified products.
As it should now be clear, the three line of intervention already outlined are strictly related. A
better general information activity is possible and effective only if the message to be
conveyed is rather simple and if there are no relevant exceptions to the general rule that
weaken the reliability of the information conveyed. At the same time, an effective and
reliable communication strategy for food quality could not ignore the role played by the
retailers and thus requires for coordination along the food chain to avoid overlapping and
contradiction, and to promote synergies.
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